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The argument contmues that it 1s important to appreciate \\hat happens on the battlefield, and to the o\ era11 strategic sltuatlon, n hen frIendI> forces halt the enemy From that point fonx ard the opponent can no longer contmue the offenswe and the mltlatn e then passes to the defenders A new set of options. or "branches and sequels," appears for the friendly side Once friend11 forces halt the aggressor, the U S and its partners ma> a) choose to impose addltlonal economic and pohtlcal sanctions on the offending county m hopes that this action ma) achlele the remaining objecti\ ss, b) continue usmg air poner to destro) crltlcal mlhtar~ , economic. or national mfrastructure targets to force enemy wlthdra\\ al from friendly terrltor> captured during the mmal mx aslon. or c) exercise the optlon of mltlatmg a ground counteroffensl\ e The later Amencan forces begin haltmg an aggressor. the closer the enem) 1s to achlel mg his object11 es and the greater the potential costs to prex ent an enemy victory 5 Propelled b> General Lmk The first IS bemg able to rapIdI> defeat mmal enem> advances short of their obJecti\ es m two theaters m close succession one folio\\ ed almost Immedlatel! b) another Mamtammg this capability 1s absolutel) critical to the United States' ab1ht.y to seize the mmatne m both theaters and to mmlmlze the amount of terrtorl, ne and our allies must regain from the enemies Failure to halt an enemy lmaslon rapidly can make the subsequent campaign to e\lct forces from captured terrxoc much more difficult lengthy, and costl) It could also weaken coalmon support undermine C S credlbll@ and increase the risk of conflict elseuhere '
From these earlJ efforts. the halt concept progressed to other areas of DOD plannmg and programmmg hfultlple national documents mcludmg the Satlonal Security Strateg) 'SSS). the these premises offer a foundation for Joint planners to de\ elop and shape mto a coherent concept that supports the goals of both Serllces
Premise 1: The Halt Phase/Strategic Preclusion goal is to ~vrest the initiative away from the adversary with such force that he is, at best, shocked mto capitulation, or, at worst, paralyzed and unable to continue with hu offensn e.
In the most llkel~ case. the U S would not apply the Halt Phase:Strateglc Preclusion preemptwel) , but lxould react to an attack that has already begun Two responses must occur
The first 1s the need to absorb the mmal blo\x and recox er from the shock and damage The second IS to stop the adversar> 's offensive as qulckl> as possible, short of his crltlcal obJecti\ es PhaseiStrateglc Preclusion concept The "ends" are the desired obJecti\ es or endstates, the 'Ways" are the strategies to achieve the objectwes, and the means are the tools. or mstruments, which mllltq and pohtlcal leaders use to implement the strategy The construct applies at man] le\ els, from national leaders using all mstruments of power to achieve a country's overall polmcal objectives. down to mdlvldual fighter formations, mfantry platoons, or naval surface combatants using their respective weapon SJ stems to achieve desired tactical outcomes on the battlefield The ox era11 endstate and polmcal object11 es must, at all times. shape the mAtar> objectir es and strateg) of the Halt PhaseiStrateglc Preclusion
The character and conduct of the Halt Phase/Strategic Preclusion ~11 also be unique to th2 nature of the specific conflict. adversar! , and enwronment Ko unn ersal Major Theater IVar template exists that one can appll to all situations This reality calls for flewblllt> honever, certain prmclples exist that should guide military campaign planners and those planning future Service resources
Conceptualize and Plan m Terms of Dewed Effects Synchronized m Space and
Time The strategist must first articulate the desired effects necessar> to halt the aggression and achlex e the campaign objectn es before determmmg the appropriate Joint "tools' necessary for the tasks To approach the problem b) first mslstmg on a ground or an-power solution. and then applying those means to the obJectives. ~111 lead to a less than optimum plan At the operational and tactical levels, the desired effects, not the ld2nnficatlon of targets to attack, must guide plannmg Planners should den\ e targets from the desired effects, not the othsr \\a> around In other nords this process like all m&tar> planmn g. 1s nof first and foremost a targeting elerclse Existing CIXC xxar plans can benefit b> rely mg on recent ad\ antes 1n speed of manem er, preclslon Lx eapons, and lntelhgence gathermg capability Stealth and standoff 1n Joint neapon SJ stems allon for much earlier parallel and simultaneous attacks of enemy milltar! systems and infrastructure They offer the opportun1tJ to impart earl? shock on an adversar) to more qmckll regain the 1n1t1at1re 1n a major com%ct The starting point for the plans must be 1n
articulating the strateg) 1n terms of parallel attacks to ach1eLe d2s1red effects For example. the plans must mo\ e awa> from the traditIona tasking of a1r component commanders bt mission categories-close a1r support. mterdlctlon. strategic attack. off2ns1L 2 and defensn e counter a1r
Instead the plans should direct a1r commanders \\1th major tasks or eff2cts "Dela) Xrd Armor Dl\ lslon north of the Blue RI\ er for 4 days," or "Den) primar! communications from xational Headquarters to Corps commanders," for example
The often-overworked phrase. "synerglstlc effect," truly applies m the situation \$ here au-.
marltlme and land forces \\ork together, each makmplts onn dlstmctl\e contrlbutlon to the overall objectwe of rapldlJ halting the enemy force Theater CIYCs and theu-staffs must carefully study the particular attrlbutes of all US systems-land, sea. and au--and capitalize on them to put their forces m the best possible posmon to resist aggression early. thus prowdmg a \\lde range of options for the pohtlcal leadership to pursue Sen~ce parochlahsm must not be allowed to block war plans that capltahze on all elements m America's milltar) arsenal 2. CIR'C Requirements for Future Improb ement.
As the regional CISCs and their staffs conceptualize and plan klable solutions to their unique situations, they ~111 dlscol er hmltatlons and shortfalls BJ translatmg those hmltatlons to future requirements, they stimulate the progress of Halt PhaseStrategic Preclusion de\ elopment
The Sen 1~2 attempts so far to ad\ ante the Halt or Preclusion concepts ha\ e been back\\ ard The> haye attempted to leap dlrectlJ from theor) to the budgeting process for future de\ elopment hflssmg m the process so far has been a concrete mAtar> strateg) on which to base budget declslons The artlculatlon of such strategies and the associated current and future reqwements to carry out the strategies must start 1% lth the warfightmg CINCs 
